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Expanding the Fiduciary Duties of Close
Corporation Shareholders: The Dilemma
Facing Illinois Corporate Law
THOMAS

J. BAMONTE*

INTRODUCTION

Shareholders generally do not owe fiduciary duties to each other or to
the corporation.' Increasingly, courts have crafted a different rule for socalled close corporations, small companies with few shareholders and no
public market for their stock. They have analogized the close corporation
to a partnership and held that shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to one
another and the corporation similar to the fiduciary duty partners owe to
each another.' Most notably in the case of Hagshenas v. Gaylord,3 the
Illinois courts have utilized this partnership analogy and imposed fiduciary
duties upon shareholders of close corporations.
In Nixon v. Blackwell,4 however, the Delaware Supreme Court
signalled its rejection of the notion that the differences between closely-held
corporations and public corporations justify such an expansion of fiduciary
duties. The Blackwell decision creates a dilemma for Illinois corporate law.
Given the preeminence of Delaware law in the corporate arena, if Illinois
does not toe the Delaware line, Illinois likely will be viewed as an even less
attractive state for incorporation vis-a-vis Delaware. 5 On the other hand,
* Partner, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., Chicago; Adjunct Professor of Law, Chicago-

Kent Law School. B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law.
1. See Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 321 (I1l. App. Ct. 1990). The Illinois
Business Corporation Act provides that "[a] holder of ... shares to a corporation shall be
under no obligation to the corporation . . . with respect to such shares other than the
obligation to pay the corporation the full consideration for which said shares were issued.").
805 ILCS 5/6.40. (West 1993).
2. See generally Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for
Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699 (1993) (surveying case law).
3. 557 N.E.2d 316 (I11.App. Ct. 1990).
4. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
5. Already, only a handful of public companies headquartered in Illinois are
incorporated in Illinois. In contrast, Delaware is the state of incorporation for roughly half
of the companies listed on the New York State Exchange. See NEW YORK STOCK
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reversing course to follow the Delaware approach sacrifices the independent
development of Illinois corporate law and may not be warranted in light of
the benefits of a limited expansion of fiduciary principles in the close
corporation context.
There is no easy way out of this dilemma. The course that Illinois
corporate law takes, however, should be informed by an understanding of
the pros and cons of applying heightened fiduciary duties in close corporations and of the political dynamics at work as states compete for corporate
charters. This article is intended to be a contribution to that process.
I. THE EXPANSION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
A. THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS

The Illinois Supreme Court outlined the defining characteristics of a
close corporation in Galler v. Galler6: "[A] close corporation is one in
which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few families, and wherein its
stock is not at all, or rarely, dealt in by buying or selling."7 Courts and
commentators point to three distinguishing characteristics of close corporations to justify enhanced shareholder fiduciary duties in close corporations!
First, the small number of shareholders in close corporations often
means that many or all of the shareholders are actively involved in operating
the business and have extensive dealings with one another. Often family
ties are involved. Courts frequently cite the closeness of the relationship
between shareholders in close corporations as supporting the analogy
between the fiduciary relationship binding partners and the relationship
between close corporation shareholders. 9
Second, many shareholders in close corporations invest the bulk of their
human and financial resources in the corporation. The family business is
illustrative. Rather than a return through dividends or capital appreciation,
such shareholders expect their return to come more in the form of salaries,
EXCHANGE GUIDE (CCH) pp. 715-800 (1994).
6. 203 N.E.2d 577 (I1l. 1965).
7. Id. at 583.
8. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 700-07.
9. See, e.g., Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("the
conduct of the brothers over the course of 40 years indicates that they maintained a fiduciary
duty similar to that of partners."); see also Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228,
233 (I11. 1968) (holding that shareholders who had been close business and personal
associates for a long period of time owed fiduciary duties to each other). See generally J.
A. C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics,Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation,
1969 U. ILL. L. F. 1.
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bonuses, repayment of loans and the like. The frustration of these
expectations when the shareholder is frozen out of the company by being
removed as an employee, officer and/or director is often cited to support the
implication and expansion of fiduciary duties shareholders owe each other
in close corporations.'"
Third, the absence of an active market for the stock of close corporations makes it difficult for the shareholders to cash out their investment.
This lack of liquidity deprives the disgruntled shareholder in a close
corporation of an option for exiting the company that is readily available to
shareholders of public companies."
B. THE "SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION" MOVEMENT AND THE EXPANSION OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY PRINCIPLES

Prompted by concerns that minority shareholders in close corporations
are all too often "oppressed" by the controlling shareholders, states have
attempted to address some of the problems that stem from the special
characteristics of close corporations. This has occurred through an
expansion of fiduciary duty principles and development of state laws
protecting shareholders against "oppression." 2
1.

Expansion Of FiduciaryDuties

Courts have followed two related approaches in expanding fiduciary
duties in the close corporation. One approach has been to analogize close
corporations to partnerships, thereby making shareholders fiduciaries of one
another. Courts have used this approach to secure "equal treatment" for
minority shareholders who complain that they are being frozen out of the
benefits of stock ownership or being treated less favorably than the
controlling shareholders. 3 The partnership analogy also supports use of

10. See generally 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.06 (2d ed. 1985). In contrast, shareholders
of public companies typically are far more diversified because their capital investments may
bear little or no relation to their employment.
11. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 583-84. See also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL

R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 230-31 (1991).
12. The two approaches inevitably overlap. The expansion of fiduciary duty principles
informs the definition of "oppression" and vice-versa. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 73845.
13. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); see also
Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F.
Supp. 1086 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1999); Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)
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principles to protect the corporation against an errant
fiduciary duty
14
shareholder.
The other approach courts have taken is to examine the particulars of
the relationship between the shareholders to determine what were the
shareholders' "reasonable expectations" at the time they embarked together
on the corporate enterprise. These courts grant relief when the minority
shareholder establishes that these expectations were unreasonably frustrated
by some action by the controlling shareholder.1 5 A prototypical case grants
who has been fired and then
relief to a long-time shareholder-employee
6
earns nothing on her stock investment.
2.

The Oppression Remedy
Most states have enacted statutes which allow disgruntled shareholders

the dissolution of the corporation upon a showing of
to petition for
17
"oppression.'

States also have created statutory alternatives to dissolution, including a buy back of the disgruntled shareholder's stock.' 8 The
buy-back remedy is a pale substitute, but a substitute nonetheless, for the
14. See, e.g., Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 323 (holding that shareholder owed fiduciary
duty to the company as well as the other shareholders).
15. See generally Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Rosenthal v.
Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849 (Mass 1988);
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019
(N.J. 1993); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987);
Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980). The "reasonable expectations"
approach has not been expressly adopted by the Illinois courts. See also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302.A.751(3)(a) (West Supp. 1992) (directing courts to "take into consideration ... the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(3)(1985)
(same).
16.. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
17. See 805 ILCS 5/12.5(b)(2) (1992). See generally 3 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORA'HON ACT. ANNOT. § 14.30 (3d. ed. 1993) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. Fraud, waste of
corporate assets and a deadlocked board of directors are commonly included as other grounds
for dissolution of a corporation.
18. The Illinois Business Corporation Act provides the following alternatives to
dissolution: (a) appointment of a provisional director; (b) appointment of a custodian and
(c) purchase of the complaining shareholder's shares by the corporation or other shareholders.
805 ILCS 5/12.55(a) (1992). See also MODEL ACT at § 14.34. See generally Charles W.
Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact
Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425 (1990); Harry J.
Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close
CorporationDissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25 (1986-87); John A.C. Hetherington and
Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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open market available to the shareholders of public companies who wish to
sell their stock.
II. CURRENT TRENDS IN ILLINOIS LAW WITH RESPECT TO DUTIES OF
CLOSE CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS

A. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Even though Illinois was a pioneer in making "oppression" the trigger
for the dissolution remedy, 9 the Illinois courts have been cautious in
expanding the fiduciary duties of close corporation shareholders. However,
in several recent decisions, the courts have signalled their willingness to
extend fiduciary principles in the close corporation context using the partnership analogy.
In Hagshenas, perhaps the most controversial Illinois corporate law
decision of the last decade, the court held that a fifty percent shareholder
breached a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation and the other two
shareholders.2" When business and personal relations between the shareholders soured, Hagshenas attempted unsuccessfully to sell his shares. 2
He then petitioned a court to order dissolution of the company based on the
crippling level of shareholder conflict and corporate deadlock but was
rebuffed.
Unable to liquidate his stock investment, Mr. Hagshenas resorted to
self-help measures. He resigned as an officer and a director. 23 The next
day he purchased a rival business and siphoned employees and customers
from the first business.2 4
The Hagshenas court held that Hagshenas owed a fiduciary duty
"similar to a partner" to the corporation and its shareholders even after
19. Illinois first included "oppression" as a ground for corporate dissolution in 1933.
1933 I1l. Laws 308, 31.
20. Hagshenas,557 N.E.2d at 323.
21. Id. at 324.
22. Id. As in most cases seeking to invoke corporate dissolution provisions of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act, Hagshenas likely was seeking to invoke the alternative
remedy of a buy-back of his stock. See 805 ILCS 5/12.55 (1992).
23. 557 N.E.2d at 318.
24. Id. at 318-19. Hagshenas reads like a case history showing the failure of Illinois
law to provide a reliable and timely mechanism for the resolution of disputes in close
corporations. If the company or the other shareholders had repurchased Mr. Hagshenas'
stock, the "self-help" remedy to which he resorted would not have been necessary and the
only battle would have been over the valuation of his stock. See generally.Thomas J.
Bamonte, Measuring Stock Value in Appraisals Under the Illinois Business Corporation Act,

80 ILL. B. J. 236 (1992).
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resigning as an officer and a director.25 According to the court, this
fiduciary duty stemmed from the "significant control" over the company that
Hagshenas retained because of his fifty percent stock interest.26 Hagshenas
was bound by this fiduciary duty until a sale of his stock or the dissolution
of the company.27
The Hagshenasdecision was heavily criticized and prompted a thus far
unsuccessful effort to legislatively restrict the fiduciary duties that attach to
shareholder status. 28 Nonetheless, several later cases interpreting Illinois
law have utilized the same partnership analogy to hold that shareholders in
close corporations may owe fiduciary duties to each other and the corporation.29
25. 557 N.E.2d at 323.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 324.
28. The Corporation and Securities Law Section Council of the Illinois State Bar
Association ("ISBA") formed a subcommittee to study the implications of the Hagshenas
decision. House Bill 700 was introduced in the 1993 legislative session as a result of the
subcommittee's effort. It would amend Section 6.40 of the Business Corporation Act to
provide in relevant part that: "A holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation, who does
not control or participate in the management of that corporation, shall have no fiduciary duty,
solely from the status as a shareholder or subscriber, to that corporation or its shareholders."
H.R. 700, 88th Gen. Assembly (1993).
H.B. 700 caused a division in the Illinois corporate bar. It was endorsed by the
ISBA Assembly. The Corporation Law Committee of the Chicago Bar Association and the
Secretary of State's Corporation Acts Advisory Committee, however, were unwilling to
support the bill. H.B. 700 has languished since it was introduced.
29. See, e.g., Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, No. 94-2529, 1995 WL 392051 (7th Cir.
June 30, 1995); Sebastian v. Zuromski, No. 91-C4529, 1993 WL 78713, at *3 (N.D. I11.
Mar.
18, 1993) (holding that a 33 % shareholder who resigned as officer and director but was
unable to sell stock back to the corporation "may have owed a fiduciary obligation to the
corporation and its shareholders" until the final sale of stock or dissolution of the company);
In re Dearborn Process Service, Inc., 149 B.R. 872, 880 (Bankr. N.D. I1l. 1993)("Shareholders in a closely held corporation owed a fiduciary duty to deal with the utmost good
faith, fairly, honestly, and openly with their fellow stockholders."); Illinois Rockford Corp.
v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228, 233 (I11.
1968) ("[The] decision to form and operate as a
corporation rather than as a partnership does not change the fact that they were embarking
on a joint enterprise, and their mutual obligations were similar to those of partners" (quoting
Tilley v. Shippe, 147 N.E.2d 347, 352 (II1.1958)); Giammanco v. Giammanco, 625 N.E.2d
990, 1002 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (recognizing principle that "as the sole and coequal
shareholders [the parties] ... owed each other a fiduciary duty similar to that of partners");
Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E.2d 712, 719 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992) (holding that three
shareholder-director brothers "maintained a fiduciary duty to each other similar to that of
partners"); see also Zokoych v. Spalding, 344 N.E.2d 805, 819 (III. App. Ct. 1976) ("In a
two-man corporation stockholders owe each other the duty to deal fairly, honestly and
openly."). Other Illinois decisions adopting the enhanced fiduciary duty standard in the close
corporation context include the following: Robinson v. The Midlane Club, No. 94-C1459,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14790 (N.D. I1.Oct. 17, 1994); Ruca Hardware, Ltd. v. Chien, No.
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B. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE DISSOLUTION REMEDY

Illinois courts have generated a substantial body of case law defining
what conduct directed against a shareholder of a close corporation is
sufficiently "oppressive" to trigger the dissolution of the corporation or an
alternative remedy such as a stock buyback. 30 There is general agreement
that "[s]hareholder oppression has not been limited to action defined as
'illegal' or 'fraudulent' or necessarily including misapplication of corporate
assets or mismanagement of funds.'
Distinguishing "oppression" from
mere heavy-handedness inevitably involves a case-specific weighing of the
facts and equities.32
Some Illinois courts appear reluctant to order statutory alternatives to
dissolution such as a buyout of the complaining shareholders' stock,
apparently believing that these alternatives are just as "drastic" as dissolution
itself.33 Thus, there is Illinois authority for the erroneous proposition that
it is necessary to prove the prerequisites for corporate dissolution in order
to trigger the alternative remedies provided for in the Illinois Business
Corporation Act.34

94-C3635, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14064 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1994); Cafcas v. Deltaan &
Richter, P.C., 699 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. IlI. 1988); Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d
1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983).
30. See Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (111. 1957); Gidwitz
v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill.
1960); Hager-Freeman v. Spircoff,
593 N.E. 2d 821, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 291
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220, 225-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Notzke
v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506,
509 (IlI. App. Ct. 1973); Compton v. Paul K. Hardin Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1972); Ross v. 311 North Cent. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 264 N.E.2d 406, 410-13 (IIl.
App. Ct. 1970). Over two-thirds of the states provide a statutory remedy for "oppression."
See also Haynsworth, supra note 18. See generally O'NEAL, supra note 10, at § 7.13.
31. See Hager-Freeman v. Spircoff, 593 N.E.2d 821, 830 (II1.App. Ct. 1992) (citing
Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. 1957)).
32. Compare Hager-Freeman v. Sprircoff, 593 N.E.2d 821, 828 (II. App. Ct. 1992)
(alleging that controlling shareholder, inter alia, terminated minority shareholder, froze her
out of business, refused to share profits or pay dividends, falsified entries in corporate books
and mismanaged company stated cause of action for oppression) with Coduti v. Hellwig, 469
N.E.2d 220, 230 (11. App. Ct. 1984)("[plaintiff's] complaints stem from his position as a
minority shareholder and from personal disagreement with [defendant], neither of which form
a basis for the drastic remedy of corporate dissolution.").
33. See Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220, 231 (11. App. Ct. 1984).
34. In Coduti, the court stated that the right to an alternative remedy under Section
12.55 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act "depends upon proof of all of the elements
which would have entitled a party to a judicial dissolution '...."
Id. However, Section
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In sum, while Illinois courts have been following the national trend
towards expanded use of fiduciary duty principles to guide the behavior of
the principals in close corporations, their application of the dissolution
remedy has been uneven.
III. THE COUNTERATTACK ON THE SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
MOVEMENT

The movement to protect minority shareholders from "oppression"
through expanded fiduciary duties and liberal application of the remedy for
shareholder "oppression" has its powerful critics.35 According to these
critics, shareholders in close corporations have ample means through private
contracting mechanisms such as buy-sell agreements and supermajority
requirements to protect themselves from "oppression. 3 6 In their view, the
analogy between the close corporation and the partnership is not as close as
it might appear. 37 Treating the two forms alike undermines the unique
characteristics of the corporation (and the partnership) as a way to structure
a business enterprise and denies society the full benefit of the efficiencies
inherent in the corporate form.38
In Nixon v. Blackwell,39 the Delaware Supreme Court rejected an
invitation to craft different and expanded fiduciary duties for close
corporations. Blackwell was a relatively attractive case for adoption of
expanded fiduciary duties. There, the controlling shareholders put in place
several mechanisms which provided a market for the stock held by
employees but did not give non-employee shareholders a similar opportunity

12.55 provides that courts may order an alternative remedy "in lieu of dismissing the action,"
which indicates that a court may impose an alternative remedy even if the plaintiff has failed
to establish the full prerequisites to dissolution. See 805 ILCS 5/12.55 (1992). Another
Illinois appellate court recently rejected Coduti's reading of Section 12.55. See Schirmer v.
Bear, 648 N.E.2d 1131 (I11.App. 1995).
The Illinois legislature recently passed a bill revamping the shareholder remedies
sections of the Illinois Business Corporation Act. S. 433, 89th Gen. Assembly (1995)
(enacted). The impact of this bill on the availability and scope of shareholder remedies is
beyond the scope of this article.
35. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 243-52. See also Robert W.
Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participantin the Solvent Business Venture: A Considerationof
the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1982).
36. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 234-36.
37. Id. at 249-50; see also Hillman, supra note 35.
38. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 249-52.
39. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
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to sell their sharesA° At the same time the company paid only "modest"
dividends even though its retained earnings "continued to increase at a
relatively high level." 41 The lower court had held that the controlling
shareholders breached their fiduciary duties by failing to provide a "parity
of liquidity" for all shareholders.42
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the "the novel legal principle
that the [non-employee] stockholders had a right to 'liquidity' equal to that
which the court found to be available to the defendants."4'3 Relying upon
Easterbrook and Fischel's critique of the notion that one aspect of fiduciary
duty is the equal treatment of investors,"4 the Court stressed that "[ilt is
well established in our jurisprudence
that stockholders need not always be
45
purposes.
all
for
equally
treated
Having ruled that the lower court had erred in utilizing an "equal
treatment" approach, the court then addressed the question of "[w]hether
there should be any special, judicially-created rules to 'protect' minority
stockholders of closely-held Delaware corporations. 46 It answered the
question with a resounding "no." Like the academic critics of the shareholder oppression movement, the Blackwell court emphasized that minority
shareholders in closely-held corporations should use contractual mechanisms
to protect themselves rather than rely upon the courts to craft special rules
for closely-held corporations.4 7 According to the court "[a] stockholder
who bargains for stock in a closely-held corporation . . . can make a
business judgment whether to buy into such a minority position, and if so
on what terms. '48 Itcharacterized efforts to expand the scope of fiduciary
49
duties in a close corporation as "inappropriate judicial legislation.

40. Id. at 1371-73. The measures providing employee shareholders with more liquidity
than non-employee shareholders included self-tenders for employee-held stock and an ESOP
which allowed employees who retired or were terminal to exchange their stock for cash. Id.
41. Id. at 1373.
42. Id. at 1374.
43. Id. at 1376.
44. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 110.
45. 626 A.2d at 1376. The Delaware General Corporation Law does not provide a
judicial dissolution remedy for shareholders who are "oppressed." It might be argued in light
of the parallels between the oppression remedy and the expansion of fiduciary duties in the
close corporation context that Blackwell's approach is not applicable in states that provide
an oppression remedy. Id.
46. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993).
47. Id. at 1380.
48. Id. at 1379-80.
49. Id. at 1377, 1380-81.
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IV. DELAWARE'S REJECTION OF ENHANCED FIDUCIARY DUTIES
CREATES A DILEMMA FOR ILLINOIS CORPORATE LAW
A. BLACKWELL WILL ENHANCE DELAWARE AS THE PREFERRED STATE OF
INCORPORATION

Blackwell will likely further increase Delaware's status as the preferred
state for incorporation.50 The decision's hard-nosed rejection of the
approach that minority shareholders are entitled to "equal treatment" and that
enhanced fiduciary duties should be implied in the close corporation context
is clearly "pro-management" in nature. Delaware's refusal to join other
states on the "shareholder oppression" bandwagon thus makes Delaware
more attractive as a place of incorporation for those in control of corporations, who typically make the incorporation decisions.
The Blackwell decision also has the effect of preserving Delaware's
dorrinant position in the development of corporate law. By holding that the
well-developed fiduciary duty principles applicable to Delaware's public
corporations also apply to closely-held corporations, Delaware made best use
of its accumulated expertise in the corporate law field. Had the Blackwell
court followed the national trend and recognized that different fiduciary duty
principles apply in close corporation context the Delaware courts would
have surrendered a portion of their advantage in the highly competitive
interstate "market for corporate charters. ''
This political dimension of the Blackwell decision also affects Illinois'
response to the decision. If Illinois corporate law continues to develop at
odds with the Blackwell approach, then Illinois may appear to -those in
control of corporations to be an even less hospitable place to incorporate
compared to Delaware. This divergence will further marginalize Illinois
corporate law, at least with respect to enterprises sizeable or sophisticated
enough to give consideration to the question where best to incorporate. 2
50. For a spirited attack on the notion that Delaware should be the preferred state of
incorporation see Charles W. Murdock, Why Illinois? A Comparison of Illinois and
Delaware CorporateJurisprudence, 19 S.ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1994).
51. For opposing views on whether or not the competition between states to induce
companies to incorporate in their state produces a desirable development of the corporate law
see William L. Cary, Federalismand Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974) and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 251 (1977). See generally LEWIS S. BLACK, JR.,
WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE (1993); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1435 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1987).
52. The advice given by many Illinois corporate lawyers is that any company which
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On the other hand, surrendering the autonomy of Illinois' corporate law by
following in lockstep with Delaware law is the ultimate marginalization of
Illinois law.53
Another piece in the puzzle is the type of corporations that incorporate
in each state. Delaware tends to attract large companies or those that have
ambitions to grow into large enterprises.54 Illinois has far fewer public
companies incorporated in the state than those which are headquartered or
which have their most significant business presence in the state. At the
same time, thousands of small enterprises continue to incorporate and do
business in Illinois.
B. THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO ILLINOIS

Illinois policymakers and jurists thus have two main options. Like
other states such as Indiana and Pennsylvania, they can tinker with the
corporation statutes in order to attempt to induce large enterprises to
incorporate in state. Under this approach, it will behoove the state to
embrace the Blackwell approach and repudiate efforts to expand the scope
of fiduciary duties. States that attempt to lure corporations away from
Delaware typically do so by making their corporate laws significantly more

expects to grow to substantial size should incorporate in Delaware, especially if there is any
chance that the company may someday go public. This advice suggests that the only
significant advantages Illinois has as a state of incorporation are lower fees and perhaps
greater familiarity with Illinois corporate law by many Illinois lawyers. Those advantages
have significance, of course, only to small enterprises which are unable to afford either the
higher Delaware fees or a lawyer familiar with Delaware law. But see Murdock, supra note
49 (arguing that Illinois should be the preferred state of incorporation for companies located
in Illinois).
53. States benefit from in-state incorporations in the form of franchise tax and fee
revenues and increased patronage for in-state law firms and other service providers. See
Curtis Alva, Delaware andthe Marketfor CorporateCharters: History and Agency, 15 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 885, 888 (1990). In addition, states can more readily regulate in-state
corporations without impinging upon the Commerce Clause. Compare CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 85-88 (1987) (discussing the "internal affairs"
doctrine giving states primary responsibility for regulating "their" corporations) with Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down state anti-takeover measure when applied
to a non-resident corporation that had a substantial in-state presence). See generally Thomas
J. Bamonte, The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A Short Critique of the CTS Decision,
8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259 (1988).
54. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 111 (1980); Barry D. Baysinger and Henry N. Butler, Race
for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10
J. CORP. L. 431 (1985); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law,
8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
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pro-management than Delaware law." Repudiating Hagshenas and the
analogy between close corporations and partnerships will signal a more promanagement tilt to Illinois corporate law.
Success in attracting more large companies to incorporate in Illinois is
far from assured, however. The experience of other states in attracting
companies from Delaware is not encouraging. Delaware has many built-in
advantages, including a well-developed body of corporate law, a judiciary
well-versed in corporate law issues and a state bar oriented toward
addressing corporate law problems. These are all assets that are not easily
duplicated in Illinois. 5
Even Illinois' relatively large size and diverse socio-economic base
works against it in its effort to induce sizeable companies to incorporate in
state. Unlike Illinois, in Delaware incorporation-related revenue accounts
for a substantial portion of the state budget. This budget reality prompts
much closer attention to corporate law issues at all levels of government in
Delaware than in Illinois. The Delaware judiciary also is small enough so
that each judge can become thoroughly versed in corporate law issues. This
promotes a degree of predictability and quality in Delaware corporate law
that is difficult to replicate in the far flung Illinois judiciary, which is faced
with many other issues of equal or greater importance than corporate law.57
Alternatively, Illinois policymakers and courts can recognize that for
all practical purposes Illinois corporate law is the law of close corporations
and will continue to be so for many years. Based upon this unpalatable
recognition, the Illinois courts, the state legislature and the Illinois corporate
bar should continue to make independent judgments whether the best
approach for Illinois' close corporations is to embrace the notion that in
some circumstances shareholders in close corporations should have expanded
fiduciary duties. The problem with such a provisional approach to the
question of fiduciary duties is, of course, identifying the limiting principles.
As the critics of special fiduciary duty rules for close corporations
argue, making it easier for "oppressed" shareholders to get judicial relief
may well have the perverse effect of increasing the frequency of crippling

55. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 et seq. (1986) (adding control share acquisition
provision making hostile takeovers much more difficult); PENN. CODE §§ 2561-2588 (adding
a series of tough anti-takeover provisions).
56. See Romano, supra note 54, at 721-22; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469, 484-91
(1987) (discussing factors accounting for Delaware's dominance in the corporate law field).
57. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle,
1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 240, 277-78 (1985) (noting that small states, first New Jersey and
then Delaware, have attracted a disproportionate share of incorporations).
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intracorporate disputes and opportunistic behavior by shareholders.58 Does
analogizing the close corporation to a partnership undermine the unique and
valuable factors of the corporation as a business form? When does
accommodating the minority's demand for liquidity threaten the financial
viability of the corporation? Will a case-by-case application of fiduciary
duties to close corporation shareholders reduce the predictability of Illinois
corporate law, further disadvantaging Illinois vis-a-vis Delaware?
There are no easy answers to these questions. The Illinois corporate
bar, however, has a major role to play in guiding the development of Illinois
law in this area. Protective intervention in the form of buy-sell agreements,
use of alternative dispute resolution devices, quality succession planning and
the like may reduce the frequency of the kind of destructive disputes which
may on occasion prompt courts to overly expand the scope of fiduciary
duties in close corporations. The more private contracting covers the areas
of dispute, the less the courts will be forced to use the blunt instrument of
expanding fiduciary duties. Likewise, more timely and flexible application
by the Illinois courts of the statutory alternative remedies to corporate
dissolution, such as phased buyouts of the stock of dissenting shareholders,
would do much to alleviate intracorporate disputes.59
CONCLUSION

The Delaware Supreme Court's refusal in the Blackwell decision to
imply enhanced fiduciary duties in close corporations based upon an analogy
between partnerships and close corporations poses a dilemma for Illinois
corporate law. On the one hand, Illinois might reverse its current course,
exemplified by cases such as Hagshenas,and follow Delaware in an attempt
to induce more resident companies to incorporate in Illinois. This approach
is unlikely to succeed and will further marginalize Illinois corporate law.
On the other hand, Illinois can continue on its present course in opposition
to the dominant corporate law of Delaware and craft special fiduciary duty
rules for close corporation. Such an approach recognizes that for all
practical purposes Illinois corporate law is the law of close corporations but
makes it even more unlikely that Illinois can improve its competitive
position against Delaware in the market for corporate charters. The only
consolation for Illinois, and a small one at that, is that forty-eight other
states face the same dilemma.
58. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 241-42.
59. For unfortunate examples of the Illinois judiciary's failure to make effective use
of the alternative remedies of Section 12.55 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, see
Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 321 (I11.App. Ct. 1990) and Coduti v. Hellwig, 469
N.E.2d 220, 231 (I11.App. Ct. 1984).

